In the case of Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India[vii], some contracts were concluded between the government and the plaintiff company. The Divisional Superintendent of the East India Railway had not received special authorization to enter into such contracts. Under the contracts, the company offered a large amount of grain, which was accepted by the railway administration. But after some time, the railway administration refused to accept the delivery of goods. It was argued that the Treaty was not in conformity with the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act 1935 and was therefore invalid and not binding on the Government. The provisions of Section 299(1) of the Constitution [Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act 1935] are binding and, if not complied with, the Treaty may not be enforced in court at the instigation of either party. In these circumstances, the Courts for the Protection of Innocent Persons applied the provisions of section 70 of the Indian Contracts Act of 1872 and found the government guilty of compensating the other party on the basis of quasi-contractual liability. Article 70 provides that, if the delivered goods are accepted or if the work performed is used voluntarily, the obligation arises to pay damages for the enjoyment of the goods or the acceptance of the said work. Thus, if a claim for compensation is invoked by one person against another under article 70, this is not done on the basis of an existing contract between the parties, but on the basis that one party has done something for the other and the work performed has been voluntarily accepted by the other party. For example, section 70 of the Contracts Act prevents “unjustified enrichment”.

Before invoking Section 70 of the Contracts Act, the following conditions must be met: Alternative dispute resolution procedures have been established in the Indian Constitution in accordance with Articles 14 and 21, which refer to the equal right and right to life and personal liberty. The Court recalled the principles set out in previous decisions and held that the provisions of article 299 were mandatory and in the public interest and held that such formalities could not be waived or waived. In the case of Guru Nanak Foundation v. Rattan Singh, the Supreme Court of India, while referring to the 1940 Act, noted that “the way proceedings are conducted under the law and challenged in the courts without exception has made lawyers and legal philosophers laugh” at the “endless debauchery at every stage that creates a legal trap for the reckless.” The Constitution of India is the fundamental norm of that country; it contains provisions that mean a harmonious integration of individual behaviour with the general well-being of society in order to achieve justice. A person`s behaviour or action only applies if it supports the overall well-being of the community. Previously, the Supreme Court ruled that in the event of non-compliance with the provisions of section 299(1), no action could be brought against the government because the treaty was unenforceable, but the government could assume responsibility through ratification. The law will help the poor who have no way to address their concerns. The bailout of the constitutional mandate began with Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and the report of the P.N. Bhagwati Judicial Commission, the weaker part thus allows to question the right of the Munsif Court to the Supreme Court. In State of Bihar v.

Karam Chand Thapar,[viii] the applicant entered into a contract with the Government of Bihar for the construction of an aerodrome and other works. After some work, there was a dispute over the payment of some bills. It was finally agreed to refer the matter back to conciliation. The said agreement was concluded in the name of the Governor and signed by the Chief Engineer. After the contract was awarded, the Government argued before a civil court that the Chief Engineer was not a person entitled to enter into a contract under the government`s opinion and that the agreement was therefore void. Based on the correspondence submitted in the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the chief engineer had been “expressly authorized” by the governor to sign the agreement in reference to arbitration .. . .